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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 991050-CA

:
Priority No. 2

MARTHA JANE HOWELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals her conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence?
Standard of review. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
"'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the
verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App. 305,125, 989 P.2d 503 (citation omitted)

{quoting State v: Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court "will reverse
a conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 'so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt"
that the defendant committed the crime.'" State v. Harley, 1999 UT App. 197, % 9, 982
P.2d 1145 {quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) and State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are at issue in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. She moved to
sever the two counts, and the second count was dismissed. Defendant was convicted by
a jury of the remaining count (R.70).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 0-5 years, with the sentence
suspended, and defendant was ordered to serve sixty days in jail and 36 months probation
(R.89). Defendant timely appealed (R.93).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant had a rocky four-year relationship with William Roberts during which
they lived together off and on (R. 109:128). In February, 1999, Roberts and defendant
were living apart. Defendant and her three children (Seth, age 10 at the time of this
incident, Shawn, age 8, and Sabrina, age 4) were living in a two-bedroom apartment in
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explained that he could not answer the page because he was on the bus, and said "if you
want me to go, I'll go" (R.109:135). He then asked to use the telephone to call for a ride,
because he had traveled by bus and could not catch another one at that hour (Id.).
Roberts tried to call his mother, who was asleep, and then tried to call a friend,
who was not home. Defendant came in and said "who you calling, your girlfriend?"
(Id.). Roberts said "no, you know better than that," and defendant dialed *69 on the
telephone to see whom Roberts had called (Id.). Roberts then tried to make another call,
and defendant jerked the phone away from him and told him to "go use the phone
somewhere else" (R. 109:136). Roberts said "okay, whatever," and prepared to leave by
putting his coat on and picking up his bag. Defendant then came to the bedroom door
holding a knife. Roberts said "hey, don't worry, I'm out of here," and walked to the
front door (R. 109:136-37).
As he was reaching for the door, Roberts saw defendant approach with the knife
out of the comer ofJiis eye. He turned, raising his arm to protect himself, and defendant
stabbed him in the upper arm (R. 109:137-38). The stab wound was very painful, and
Roberts fell to the floor. He got up, yelling, and left the apartment (R. 109:138).
After he left defendant's apartment, Roberts knocked on other apartment doors
until he found someone home who could call for help (R. 109:138-39). An ambulance
and the police arrived within a few minutes, and Roberts was taken to the hospital for
treatment of a two-inch stab wound to his upper arm (R. 109:69)
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As soon as Roberts left the apartment, defendant sought to hide the evidence of
her attack, She talked to the children and Scott, telling them that if the police came and
about the incident, they should »a\ llllhit RubetlLs "wis all cads hlcidmu \\\\\ mi In
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to tell the police that they had been sitting on the couch in the front room, watching
television when Roberts had come to the door (R, 109* 114) She then moved a couch to
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Roberts to Seth .and told him to clean it off and hide it. Seth obeyed, hiding the knife
inside the hollow metal frame of his bed (R.109:92-93,114-1S)
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\k.i09:82,88-89). I he officers together interviewed defendant. They asked dckiidoiil
whether Roberts had, in fact, come into the apartment and stayed for a few mini ites

5

rather than just stepping inside and then leaving, as she had earlier asserted. Defendant
then stated that Roberts had come in and used the telephone (R. 109:82).
Detective Anderson asked defendant if she had stabbed Roberts. She denied it,
insisting that she did not know how Roberts had been injured. She told the officers that
she'd been watching a movie and Roberts had come to the door, knocked or rang the
bell, and then barged his way in. She then pushed him out (R. 109:90).
Defendant said she noticed that Roberts was bleeding when he first came in.
Roberts was not complaining of his injury, however, but was asking who was there in the
apartment. She said that sometime later, Roberts began complaining about the injury,
and started yelling and screaming. She said that Roberts was only in the apartment for a
short time (R.109:91).
Defendant was arrested, and the police continued their investigation, interviewing
defendant's children and recovering the knife Seth had hidden in his bed frame
(R.109:91-93).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant is required to marshal all
of the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the
verdict. Defendant fails to meet her burden to marshal the evidence both because she
ignores significant evidence, and because she draws every inference from that evidence
contrary to the verdict.
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Further, even if the inferences that defendant seeks to draw are accepted, contrary
to the verdict, these inferences do not imply that the jury's verdict is unreasonable. The
verdict indicates that the jury accepted the victim's testimony that he was attempting to
leave defendant's apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind. None of the
inferences regarding the victim's alleged hostility that defendant now argues (even if
accepted contrary to the verdict) undermines this testimony or the jury's rejection of
defendant's claim of self-defense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
Defendant asserts that the gijdence presentedgto the jury at trial i^flwufficient to
support the jury's conclusion that she did not act in self-defense when she stabbed
William Roberts, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying her motion for a
directed verdict. See Brief of Appellant, p. 9. To the contrary, the evidence presented by
the State fully dispels any inference that defendant acted in self-defense, and the
evidence presented by defendant to support her self-defense theory is both ambiguous
and inherently contradictory.
A. Defendant has not met her burden to marshal the evidence
To properly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant is required in her
brief to acknawkdge theftillextent of the evidence against her. "The burden is heavy on
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$ defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant 'must first marshal all
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even
viewed m the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict.'" State v.
Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 f 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citation omitted) {quoting State v.
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). Reversal occurs "on|y_ y/h*n the evidence
i§$o inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have
entertHmed~HTW5§onable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." Strain, 885
P.2d at 819 (quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (additional
quotations omitted)). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.").
In her brief, defendant acknowledges smng but not all, of the evidence presented.
Defendant recites the facts testified to by the victim, but ignores the testimony by the
other witnesses regarding her own actions and statements which provide additional
evidence that she did not act in self-defense. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-15. Further,
in describing the evidence presented, defendant draws every available inference contrary
to the verdict: although Roberts testified that he did not threaten defendant at any time
and was simply trying to leave the apartment when defendant stabbed him, defendant
tries to argue that Robert's assertions are "incredulous" because of other evidence that
she believes implies that Roberts had some hostility toward her. See Brief of Appellant,
pp. 14-20 ("In light of such evidence, it does not require a significant inferential leap to
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see that Robertsiwas extremely hostile ..."). By failing to discuss evidence of her lies to
the police and other attempts to hide her involvement in the stabbing, and by drawing
broad inferences adverse to the jury's verdict, defendant has failed to marshal the
evidence, and the court should not consider her sufficiency claim.
B. The jury's rejection of defendant's self-defense theory was
reasonably based upon direct testimony.
As noted above, defendant failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the
jury's verdict, but her brief does acknowledge the testimony of the victim, William
Roberts. Defendant characterizes this testimony in her brief as follows:
The victim, Roberts, testified that Howell invited him to stay at her
apartment for the weekend. When he arrived at the apartment, Howell
began to verbally harass him about the fact that he did not answer her page.
She also harassed him about a doll that he brought to her daughter.
Roberts testified that Howell told him to leave the apartment a few
times. Roberts unsuccessfully attempted to call his mother and afriendin
order to find a place to go. Roberts then went into a back room to give the
doll to Howell's daughter. Howell then approached Roberts with a knife.
Roberts testified that he merely responded, "hey, don't worry, I'm out of
here" and headed for the front door. Roberts was reaching for the front
door, with his back towards Howell, when she came at him with the knife.
Roberts turned around with his hands raised in a defensive posture when
she stabbed him in his upper right arm. Roberts fell to the floor, started
yelling, then left the apartment.
Brief of Appellant, p. 12 (citations omitted). Even this limited description of the
evidence is entirely sufficient to prove that defendant did not act in self-defense, since it
proves that defendant stabbed Roberts from behind, as he was attempting to leave the
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apartment. If this testimony is credited, as it was by the jury, there is ample evidence to
support the verdict and reject defendant's claim of self-defense.
To avoid the obvious significance of this testimony, defendant argues that the
victim was not a credible witness, asserting on appeal the same general attack on the
victim's credibility that was argued at trial and rejected by the jury. On appeal, the jury's
assessment of the victim's credibility is not subject to weighing by this court. "We may
not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict. ""State v. Chaney, 1999 UT
App 309, f30, 989 P.2d 1091 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87
(Utah 1993)); see also State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah App. 1998) ("It is not the
function of a reviewing court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of
witnesses.")- It is true that an appellate court may, "in some unusual circumstances,"
assess witness credibility. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). However,
such circumstances are limited to testimony that is "inherently improbable" in that there
"must exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity must
be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." Id. Roberts' testimony
does not describe actions that are physically impossible and is not obviously false.
Rather, in attacking the victim's credibility, defendant resorts entirely to "inferences or
deductions" from other testimony; possible inferences and deductions that were
evaluated and rejected by the jury.
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In challenging the victim's credibility, defendant draws broad inferences from
three types of evidence: evidence of a loud argument between Roberts and defendant
that evening, evidence of Robert's prior actions toward defendant, and evidence of
provocation by defendant. None of this evidence reaches the core issue of the victim's
credibility on the issue of whether defendant stabbed him from behind, and relies entirely
upon inferences rejected by the jury.
Evidence of the argument that night (Brief ofAppellant, p. 14-16). Defendant
describes at length testimony that implies defendant and Roberts were arguing loudly that
night. At most, and drawing inferences adverse to the jury verdict, this evidence only
implies that at trial, Roberts may have understated his level of agitation that night to
some degree during his testimony. However, this evidence does not at all address the
fundamental fact of guilt that the jury decided; i.e., whether defendant stabbed Roberts as
he was trying to leave. In order to strengthen the inference, defendant asserts that there
was evidence that Roberts "got physical" with her prior to the stabbing. Brief of
Appellant, p. 16. However, this inference is largely based upon the testimony of Jack
Scott, who also testified directly that defendant acted in self-defense (R. 109:172), and
whose testimony was necessarily rejected by the jury as not credible. Defendant is left,
therefore, with another inference (again, adverse to the verdict) based upon Jeremy
Seegmiller's vague testimony that he heard "big bumps'9 on the ground from another
room (R. 109:122-23). This evidence, even if believed, is not sufficient to support any
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conclusion about Roberts' actions toward defendant, let alone sufficient to compel a
conclusion that defendant acted in self defense at the time she stabbed Roberts.
Evidence of Roberts' general hostility (Brief of Appellant, p. 17-18). Defendant
asserts that the evidence shows Roberts was hostile and threatening in their relationship
generally, citing Roberts' admissions that he was upset over defendant's infidelity, and
quoting phone messages and a letter written by Roberts. These statements are of little
relevance to the issue of defendant's claim of self-defense. The phone messages are
profane, but do not in any way constitute threats of physical violence. Even defendant
could not have considered them to be threatening to her, as it is undisputed that
defendant called Roberts and invited him to spend the weekend with her, after the
messages had been left. The letter likewise could not be construed as evidence of
physical violence toward defendant; it actually constitutes an offer of money, a
profession of love, and a proposal of marriage. However, even if one assumes, contrary
to the obvious import of these statements and contrary to the inferences dictated by the
jury's verdict, that defendant had some level of physical hostility toward defendant, that
would not imply that the jury was unreasonable in finding that Roberts had turned to
leave the apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind.
Evidence of defendant's provocation (Brief ofAppellant, p. 19). Defendant asserts
that Roberts must have been lying when he denied physically attacking her, because her
own "obnoxious" behavior inevitably would have angered him. Even this proposed
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inference, however, does not support a further inference that Roberts therefore became so
angry that he attacked defendant, requiring her to defend herself by stabbing him. At
most, the irrational, provocative behavior by defendant that Roberts described provides
only a possible inference (adverse to the jury's verdict) that Roberts could have been
understating the extent of his own anger that night. More reasonably (and consistent
with the verdict), however, this irrational behavior merely substantiates Roberts'
testimony that defendant's attack on him was unprovoked.
In essence, defendant is arguing that the jury's verdict should be overturned on the
basis of an inference based upon another inference. First, defendant is asserting that the
jury reasonably must have inferred that Roberts was hostile towards defendant on that
evening, even in the face of contrary evidence. Second, defendant is asserting that, based
entirely upon that first inference of hostility, the jury must also have inferred that Roberts
must have acted in such a threatening way that defendant had to stab him to protect
herself.
* * *

"When there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from it, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can be reasonably
made, our inquiry stops and we sustain the verdict." State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 995,
996 (Utah 1987). The jury accepted Roberts' testimony that he was leaving the
apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind, and none of the evidence generally
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attacking Roberts' credibility now cited by defendant is sufficient to overcome this basic
finding by the jury. The jury was confronted with two conflicting versions of the events
on that evening: one from William Roberts and one from Jack Scott. The jury believed
Roberts.1
As defendant acknowledges in her brief, "In cases involving issues of selfdefense, 'contradictory testimony, without more, is not grounds for reversal.'" Brief of
Appellant, p. 14 (quoting State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985)). The possible
inferences defendant now argues should be drawn are contrary to the jury's verdict, and
should not be considered on appeal. Nevertheless, even if these inferences are accepted,
they do not render the direct testimony relied upon by the jury so "inconclusive or
inherently improbable" as to be insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict.
Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, J30.

1

In order to believe Scott, the jury would have had to ignore the fact that Scott
originally lied to the police, and would have had to believe that although Roberts
traveled two hours by bus to visit defendant and brought a carefully chosen, sentimental
gift for her and her daughter, upon arrival he immediately and angrily pushed his way in
the apartment door and shoved defendant down the hall. Further, the jury would have
had to accept the proposition that although defendant called and invited Roberts over for
the weekend, she was afraid of him, and would have had to believe that although
defendant thought she was justified in using the knife in self-defense, she nevertheless
attempted to destroy the evidence, lied to police, and then instructed her children to lie in
an attempt to cover up her actions.
14

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^Tday of August, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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